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Introduction 
The last two decades have seen the exponential growth of the Chinese
Internet and accordingly an explosion of studies on the Chinese Internet.
It is universally agreed that the rapid growth of the Internet has brought
profound changes to the Chinese political and social landscape. Within
that general framework, there has been intense debate about whether and
how greater access to information facilitated by the versatile and dis-
persed nature of the Internet encourages political expression and democ-
racy in China. On one pole, scholars optimistically argue that by multiply-
ing the amount of available information and providing individuals with the
means to disseminate their opinions, the Internet has become a democra-
tising force that will undermine the Party’s authoritarian rule. (1) They argue
that those new features – enabled by the technological advantages of the
Internet – are particularly significant for China, where citizens previously
had little opportunity for unconstrained public expression or access to free
and uncensored information. (2)
In contrast to this optimistic view, others tend to dwell on the way that the
state represses and controls the Internet. These clusters of scholarship argue
that while the explosion of ICT-enabled political communication poses huge
challenges to the state’s monopoly on information, the state has responded
to the challenge through draconian control over the flow of information.
Standing in this pole, existing scholarship provides ample explanations of how
the state has responded to the new challenges through various controlling
measures, such as setting a variety of legal instruments, establishing dozens
of new government agencies in charge of regulating different aspects of the
Internet, and introducing technology to censor information supposedly detri-
mental to the interests of the state and social security. (3)
Whether pessimistic or optimistic, scholars studying the Chinese Inter-
net have demonstrated the dual impact of the phenomenal growth of the
Chinese Internet: on the one hand, there is increasing diffusion of thought
and openness of information; and on the other hand, there is an expansion
of the CCP’s governing mechanism over online information. 
Abundant scholarship shows that the CCP’s direct control over online in-
formation is pervasive and sophisticated. It has introduced various levels of
technical control, comprised of multiple layers of legal regulations and in-
volving numerous state agencies and thousands of public and private per-
sonnel. (4) Institutionally, it is estimated that at least 12 government agen-
cies – functioning in a variety of ways – are involved in censoring the In-
ternet, among which the most important one is the State Internet Infor-
mation Office (SIIO). Established in 2011, the office is notably in charge of
launching online political campaigns and supervising online content man-
agement. (5) The chief of the SIIO, Lu Wei, deserves scholarly attention.
Since taking over the SIIO in 2013, he has demonstrated a canny aware-
ness of the Internet and social media and has also proactively tightened
control over online public opinion. (6)
Technologically, China has established one of the largest and most sophis-
ticated Internet monitoring systems in the world to censor and manipulate
unfavourable information on the Internet. Framing it as “networked author-
itarianism,” some scholars explain the parallel between the scale of infor-
mation on the Internet on the one hand and information censorship on the
other. While a wide range of information about social problems or injustices
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appears on websites, the sole ruling Party remains in control over informa-
tion to such a degree that no information can challenge state power. In the
same vein, while people sometimes feel a much greater sense of freedom
to express their opinion, Internet users who voice overly critical opinions
that the rulers see as threats are systematically jailed. (7)
The logic underlying the explicit and direct control over online informa-
tion is to ensure that the information that circulates online will not chal-
lenge Party authority. However, beneath the surface of the constantly in-
creasing and intensifying control measures is a rising level of public self-
expression and emerging consciousness of “participative citizenry” in
China. (8) By virtue of various strategies, notably political satire or ironic use
of politically correct language, insubordinate Chinese Internet users suc-
cessfully skirt censorship and voice prohibited opinions. (9)
Realising that regulating public opinion through total control or repres-
sion seems to yield poor returns on effort in the new technology environ-
ment, the Chinese government has attached increasing importance to
guiding public opinion toward positions favoured by the CCP
leadership. Two examples stand out in representing the CCP’s efforts to
guide public opinion: paid web commentators and government mi-
croblogs. As early as the mid-2000s, the CCP regime appointed thousands
of commentary teams to disseminate pro-Party views. The goal was to
create the impression of a strong tide of social opinion endorsing the gov-
ernment. To address public opinion and demands on the Internet, the Chi-
nese Party-state later actively incorporated microblogs into their admin-
istrative operations as a form of e-government. Official microblogs were
designed to release information, interact with the masses, and respond to
public demands. (10) The first government microblog was launched by Yun-
nan’s provincial government in November 2009. (11) After that, numerous
official microblogs were launched and attracted extensive social atten-
tion. By 2013, more than 258,737 government microblogs had been set
up, including 183,232 government agency microblogs and 75,505 official
microblogs. (12)
While there was a surge in the employment of Internet commentators
and official microblogs to guide online public opinion, growing specula-
tion about the efficiency of those measures guiding online public opinion
has emerged in current literature. The strategy of recruiting pro-Party
commentators to counter oppositional online opinions was quickly iden-
tified by ordinary people. Official microblogs were considered top-down
information relay tools rather than as interactive platforms with ordinary
people. The effectiveness of the microblogs was therefore questioned in
respect of enhancing direct exchanges between the Party-state and neti-
zens. (13) Surveys among Chinese netizens have also revealed that Chinese
government microblogs are considered a state-centric model of online
Party propaganda tool. (14)
The difficulty of controlling public opinion partly resulted from the fact
that the Internet has increasingly become the first place where news re-
lated to official corruption, governmental maladministration, property
and labour rights violations, and conflicts between the underprivileged
and the powerful have appeared. (15) These issues, touching on what ordi-
nary Chinese people are most concerned about, can quickly go viral and
turn into a cause célèbre that sparks emotional outpourings against social
problems on the Internet. For example, recent years witnessed the case of
Wenzhou Train Crash on 23 July 2011, Deng Yujiao on 10 May 2009, (16)
and the Yihuang self-immolation incident on 10 September 2010, in
which netizens expressed intense outrage towards official malfea-
sance. (17) The accumulating online mobilisation and public discontent led
to a decline in the credibility of the government and threatened the
Party-state’s legitimacy. (18)
The advent of the Xi Jinping regime represents a sharp new turn in the
political climate, with the government exercising increasing levels of con-
trol over public discourse. While the preceding Hu-Wen leadership also
tightened control over the Internet, the new leadership has proven much
more aggressive in its ideological demands. What is more, in order to rem-
edy the government’s deteriorating credibility resulting from the public
opinion crisis, the central government has adopted new tactics to main-
tain its influence over microblogs, focusing on regulating online senti-
ment such as resentment against social inequality and official corruption.
Firstly, the Chinese government has engaged in a new round of ideological
campaigns among public opinion leaders. On the one hand, the new
regime has repressed public opinion leaders who voice critical opinions;
on the other hand, however, it has wooed obedient public opinion leaders
to take the initiative to uphold the Party’s ideology on the Internet. Sec-
ondly, the new regime has paid renewed attention to appeasing public in-
dignation and purging negative emotion from the Internet. The fresh
strategy is in line with the Party’s new policy regarding Internet regula-
tion, which calls for developing a favourable and healthy cyberspace.
Under the slogan of purifying cyberspace, the Internet information man-
agement advocated by Xi Jinping focuses on rectifying the chaos of an In-
ternet full of rumours and public resentment. (19)
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Research Method 
This paper intends to illustrate how Xi and the current establishment
have employed new tactics to manipulate public opinion and public emo-
tion on microblogs in a more proactive way. To this end, I have used em-
pirical data from documentary analysis and journalists’ analysis. Some
government and Party documents were acquired during my participation
and observation in the investigative reporting team of a Chinese online
news outlet from December 2013 to April 2014 for my research project
exploring Chinese investigative journalism in the new digital era. Most gov-
ernment and Party documents were circulated within official departments.
I acquired them from political journalists at this online news outlet when
I did in-depth interviews with them. With their expertise in reporting on
official policies and conducting interviews with high-ranking government
officials, these political journalists could gain access to internally-circu-
lated documents and the most updated government policies. In addition,
with its focus on critical and investigative reporting, the newspaper was
particularly affected by information control on the Internet, because the
Internet is a great source of story leads and news resources for investiga-
tive journalists. As a result, journalists are particularly sensitive to changes
in Internet policy. In such situation, the official documents they obtained
and the up-to-date policies they acquired could be considered the latest,
most authoritative, and most valuable sources for studying new trends in
public opinion management on the Internet. The documents were selected
as relevant to the most notable fresh strategies used by the new regime to
regulate online public opinion and public emotion. Since these documents
were for internal circulation only, I am unable to clearly identify the name
of the documents and the institutions that published them in order to pro-
tect the privacy of the journalists. 
It should be noted that I am constrained by the limited documents that
I could gain access to, which prevented me from getting all the new Inter-
net policies. However, what I discuss here are the policies that represent
the newest adjustments of the current regime in regulating online public
opinion and public emotion in the microblogsphere. 
Some other documentary sources were public information that could be
accessed on the Internet. This predominantly includes data from the Peo-
ple’s Daily Public Opinion Monitoring Room and declarations by officials of
government institutions. Launched by People’s Daily in 2008, the Public
Opinion Monitoring Room is China’s first professional organisation aimed
at collecting, monitoring, and analysing nationwide public opinion on the
Internet. Through mapping the whole picture of online public opinion, the
room is designed to provide sources for making more effective policies for
controlling information. The room has benefited from its identity as a
Party organ, which allows it solicit views from experts and professionals
with backgrounds in communications, sociology, economics, public man-
agement, and mathematics. In addition, the large scale of public opinion
the room monitors and the advanced technology of collecting and pro-
cessing information facilitate the room’s production of relatively authori-
tative data, which has also become an important source for scholars who
explore the Chinese Internet. Regarding official declarations, all of them
came from authoritative Party-organ newspaper to ensure their accuracy
and authenticity. The declarations were selected as the most relevant to
my research focus. 
Represented by People’s Daily, official microblogs were also important to
me in illustrating my arguments in this paper. In the new campaign to reg-
ulate online information, People’s Daily is a bellwether vested with the re-
sponsibility of leading the official voice and coordinating with other offi-
cial microblogs to uphold the Party’s ideology on the Internet. I tracked
every microblog posted by People’s Daily from July 2012 to December
2014. I downloaded each day’s People’s Daily microblog for my easy ref-
erence. 
It is true that the Xi administration has issued various policies on Internet
regulation. However, this paper only discusses the newest ones that are
relevant to the focus of my paper. What I have illustrated here should be
enough to support my argument. By mapping the new policies of the Xi
regime on regulating public opinion and public emotion, this paper hopes
to lay the foundation for further scholarship. 
Seven bottom-line policy and Six objectives
policy
On 10 August 2013, the State Internet Information Office issued a policy
of Seven bottom lines of Internet information as the major guidance for
the new ideological campaign on online public opinion. (20) According to
People’s Daily, the Seven bottom lines were:
The bottom-line of enhancing the socialist system; the bottom-line
of upholding national interest; the bottom line of obeying laws and
regulations; the bottom-line of protecting citizen’s legal rights; the
bottom line of maintaining social and public order; the bottom-line
of promoting social ethics and virtue; the bottom-line of dissemi-
nating facts and truths. (21)
The Seven bottom lines were described as “high voltage power lines” or
“the boundary of a political mine-field” that anyone should not touch or
step into when releasing information and opinions on the Internet. (22)
The proposal of Seven bottom lines of online communication is power-
ful. Firstly, it is a management method for traditional media adapted to the
new media space. The authorities have set minefields for traditional media,
which make journalists cautious when reporting sensitive political-social
problems. These minefields are both visible and invisible so that journalists
practice self-censorship to ensure that their coverage won’t be deemed
too aggressive. Nowadays, the bottom-line is also set for ordinary people
to prevent them from voicing critical opinions on the Internet. If the prac-
tice of censoring and deleting online information includes passive and ex
post strategies, the establishment of bottom lines is a pre-emptive meas-
ure that forces ordinary people to conform to regulation and stops them
from posting information critical of the Party’s ideological hegemony.
What is more, the definition of the bottom line is so vague that it is diffi-
cult to judge what types of information will (or will not) violate the bot-
tom-line regulation. Such ambiguity may lead to self-censorship when or-
dinary people experiment with online communication. (23)
N o . 2 0 1 5 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 17
20. “Zhongguo hulianwang dahui changyi gongshou ‘qi tiao dixian’” (China Internet Conference Ad-
vocates for Following Seven Bottom Lines), Xinhua, 15 August 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2013-08/15/c_116961278.htm (accessed on 13 June 2015).
21. “Gongshou ‘qi tiao dixian’ zhuzao jiankang wangluo huanjing” (Holding Seven Bottom Lines 
and Creating a Healthy Online Environment), People’s Daily, 15 August 2013, http://opinion.peo-
ple.com.cn/BIG5/8213/368023/index.html (accessed on 25 May 2014).
22. Ibid.
23. Perry Link, “China: The Anaconda in the Chandelier,” New York Review of Books, Vol. 49, No. 6,
2002, pp. 13-20.
Angela Ke Li – Towards a More Proactive Method
18 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 5 / 4
Special feature
Along with the Seven bottom lines, new rules have been implemented to
punish critical netizens. On 8 September 2013, the Chinese Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued a judicial interpre-
tation stating that people who post false information on the Internet may
face up to three years in prison if the posting is viewed more than 5,000
times or re-tweeted 500 times. (24) The new rule forces ordinary microblog
users to think carefully before they post opinions or emotional remarks,
which could easily be regarded as false information. Moreover, individual
microblog users have no control over how many times a post is viewed
and re-tweeted, so the new policy increases pressure towards conformity. 
To further show the government’s determination to take up a national
campaign to sanitise Internet expression, the State Internet Information
Office announced Six objectives that the campaign intends to achieve. (25)
According to Lu Wei, the leader of the Office, the six objectives are as fol-
lows: 
First, listening to public opinion and appeasing negative emotional
outpourings against government legitimacy; second, promoting ad-
vanced socialist culture and upholding truth, virtue, and courtesy;
third, fighting against Internet rumours; fourth, accelerating the en-
actment of Internet laws and regulations; fifth, safeguarding Inter-
net security; finally, developing Internet technology and leading to
a boom in the Internet industry. (26)
It seems apparent that the new leadership, like its predecessors, is still
deeply anxious about the Internet’s subversive effect of facilitating mobil-
isation that could turn against CCP rule. As a result, the government has
continued to tighten control over the Internet. However, through the lens
of the Seven bottom-lines and Six objectives, I argue that the new regime
is not only continuing its heavy-handed control over information but is
also paying more attention to emotional outpourings. The crude practices
of blocking and censoring online information will continue, but the regime
will make a greater effort to lead Internet users to give up expressing angry
and aggrieved emotions.
Anti-public opinion leader policy: The time of
Big Vs has passed 
Microblogs provide the Chinese people with unprecedented opportuni-
ties to engage in public debates about political and social issues closely re-
lated to their lives. The increasing amount of information on microblogs
has weakened the influence of Party media in setting the news agenda.
What is more, public debates about hot-button issues on the Internet
could transform a news event into a cause célèbre that sparks emotional
outpouring. The mix of critical public opinion and emotional catharsis has
aroused CCP leaders’ uneasiness over the destabilising effect of the Inter-
net and has motivated them to continue investing heavily in mechanisms
to regulate online information and public expressions.
In order to make control over information more effective, the new lead-
ership put a new emphasis on public opinion leaders (also known as “Big
Vs”), who are mostly liberal and outspoken and have a profound influence
on shaping the agenda of public debate on the Internet. Compared with
the myriad grass-roots microbloggers, public opinion leaders are much
fewer. However, they are much more powerful than ordinary people in set-
ting the agenda of public discussions and debates, because their identity
gives personal credibility to information and attracts immense attention.
Some Big Vs are bold enough to articulate what others do not dare to say
under political censorship. (27) By targeting public opinion leaders, the new
leadership has found an easy but effective way to control online critical
discourse. 
The People’s Daily Public Opinion Monitoring Room has pointed to four
powerful groups that compete for control over the news agenda in the mi-
croblog sphere. According to them, these are government microblogs, pub-
lic opinion leaders, market-oriented media, and Party media, among which
online public opinion leaders are the most likely to release critical opinions
against the Party. (28)
Realising their significance in setting the news agenda, and in hopes of
better controlling information on the Internet, the authorities for the first
time launched measures specifically designed to control online public lead-
ers. Firstly, the government set criteria to clarify who is (or is not) a public
opinion leader. The government made a list of 300 public opinion leaders
based on three criteria: number of followers (at least 100,000 fans), number
of times that they were quoted in traditional media, and how radical their
opinions were. The government also provided profiles of these 300 public
opinion leaders. They are predominately male and 40 to 60 years old.
Nearly 70% of them hold a Master’s degree or above. A majority of those
public opinion leaders work in the broadly defined media field, such as tra-
ditional media institutions, the film industry, the book publishing industry,
advertising companies, and so on. They earn an annual income of 100,000
to 600,000 yuan and thus can be regarded as middle-class in today’s China.
The defining feature of online public opinion leaders is that they keep close
contact with the traditional media. As a consequence, they are particularly
willing to strategically use the Internet to expose news stories that are
banned from reporting in the traditional media. (29)
The ideological campaign targeting influential (micro)bloggers on the In-
ternet started with the Conference of Online Public Opinion Leaders, held
by the State Internet Information Office on 15 August, 2013. (30) The con-
ference required Internet celebrities to take social responsibility for
spreading positive energy and to comply with the Seven bottom lines
when posting information or expressing opinion on the Internet. Lu Wei,
director of the State Internet Information Office, proposed six expecta-
tions concerning the Big Vs on the conference: 
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First, Big Vs – with large numbers of followers – should take the ini-
tiative to shoulder social responsibility; second, Big Vs are obliged to
protect state interests, promote positive energy (31) and encourage
netizens to contribute to China’s rejuvenation; third, Big Vs should
consciously promote advanced socialist culture and traditional Chi-
nese virtue; fourth, Big Vs should take the lead in following laws and
regulations; fifth, Big Vs should advocate social integrity and good
faith; finally, Big Vs should maintain individual legitimate rights and
interests and resist any activities that damage individual reputa-
tions and rights. (32)
In practice, for obedient public opinion leaders who are either unenthu-
siastic about social and political issues or willing to follow the Party line,
the authorities have encouraged them to promote Party ideology and
guide their followers to participate in online discussion in the politically
correct direction. On the other side, the detention of some Big Vs such as
Xue Manzi has served to intimidate potentially critical public opinion lead-
ers. Xue Manzi, an Internet Big V and Chinese-American venture capitalist,
was detained in Beijing on 23 August 2013. Although Beijing police offi-
cials claimed that Xue was detained on charges of soliciting a prostitute,
some scholars have speculated that the real reason underlying his deten-
tion was probably his active and critical remarks on current affairs. (33) Ac-
cording to data provided by the Internet Opinion Monitoring Room under
People’s Daily, since the crackdown, the number of posts by a sampling of
100 public leaders declined by nearly 25% in September 2013, only one
month after the conference. (34) Some scholars also noticed the phenome-
non that Big Vs were less active than before. (35)
Cultivating Medium Vs and planting positive
information 
Ever since the Mao Zedong era, the methods used by CCP leaders to in-
culcate political loyalty and ideological conformity has reflected an acute
awareness that peer groups have a greater impact on individual attitudes
than authority figures. (36) In the Hu administration, propaganda officials ap-
plied this insight to online information management by employing paid In-
ternet commentators disguised as ordinary people to participate in public
debates. Under Xi’s leadership, online Medium Vs act as peers to guide pub-
lic opinion. Medium Vs have verified accounts with moderate numbers of
followers – less than Big Vs but far more than grassroots users. (37) Although
they are not as influential as Big Vs, Medium Vs’ concerns and opinions
about social and political issues can also attract considerable attention
from ordinary Internet users. Generally speaking, Medium Vs are professors,
high-ranking editors and journalists, or lawyers and experts. Because they’re
usually experts in various areas, their ideas can be considered authoritative
in their own field. Therefore, the government cultivates Medium Vs (38) to
propagate the Party’s line and support Party policies on controversial is-
sues. (39) Based on the current literature, we only know that the Party-state
intends to promote Medium Vs on the microblogsphere. However, a series
of question deserves further scholarly attention when more policies be-
come available, such as the specific ways in which the regime cultivates
Medium Vs and how Medium Vs lead public opinion on the Internet.  
Compared with previous methods creating a wave of pro-Party voices
through paid commentators, making use of Medium Vs is a more opaque and
subtle way to influence public opinion, because ordinary people do not know
that Medium Vs’ opinions on social issues are following the Party’s instruc-
tions. Much more importantly, planting positive online commentaries and in-
fluencing public opinion through Medium Vs are much more effective strate-
gies than using paid commentators, because their identity as experts or intel-
lectual elites give more authority to the opinions they espouse. By virtue of
the new Internet management strategies, the new leadership expects the
positive voices of official microblogs, allying with the voices of Medium Vs,
could overwhelm critical voices on the Internet. Some scholars estimate that
this round of Internet governance, aimed at courting or intimidating influen-
tial people on the Internet, is much harsher than ever before. (40)
Government microblogs and guiding public
opinion
On 25 February 2014, Xi Jinping organised the first conference of the
newly-established Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informati-
sation.  Xi called for innovative methods to spread mainstream values,
stimulate positive energy, and maintain proper guidance of online public
opinion. Xi said:
We must be adept at guiding public opinion on the Internet. Doing
a good job of guiding public opinion is a long-term mission. (41)
Guidance of public opinion on the Internet became the buzzword of the
new leadership’s policy over the Internet. 
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41. “Xi Jinping zhuchi zhaokai xinxi wangluo anquan xinxi xiaozu shouxi huiyi” (Xi Jinping Held the
Conference of the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation), People’s Daily,
27 February 2014, http://news.sohu.com/20140227/n395778590.shtml (accessed on 14 Novem-
ber 2015).
Guidance of public opinion is not an innovative idea in the realm of the
Party’s media policy. (42) It has been the centrepiece of propaganda work
since the crackdown on the student movement in Tiananmen Square in
1989. (43) Between the two extremes of enforcing/upholding ideologically-
sound public opinion and repressing ideologically-critical public opinion,
guiding public opinion is a more indirect, flexible, and subtle way of influ-
encing and shaping public opinion. Guidance of public opinion tries to shift
its focus from controlling what can be discussed (or not) to what people
should think about current affairs. To be specific, when hot-button issues
relevant to social problems spread on the Internet, the government tries to
manipulate the angles and perspectives through which people think about
them and attempts to divert ordinary people’s attention from questioning
and criticising the government by showing sympathy to the suffering of
the people and by emphasising the hope for a better future. 
Through the lens of the changing strategy of official microblogs, we may
get a glimpse of how guidance of public opinion is practiced. In 2013, the
CCP, across all levels and administrative departments, continued to struggle
with microblogs. (44) Compared with 2012, official microblogs increased by
46.42% (more than a quarter of million in total), among which microblogs
held by government agencies increased by 61% and microblogs owned by
individual officials increased by less than 20%. (45) Beyond the increase in
the number of government microblogs, government microblogs enhanced
cooperation and broke down isolation among themselves. In order to lead
public opinion on emergencies and sensitive issues, the People’s Daily allied
itself with other Party media and government organs to establish a national
microblog team. (46) The national microblog team is designed to respond in
concert when hot issues spread on the Internet to amplify the voice of the
Party and thus overpower the voices of netizens. (47) Such collaboration
promises to make the voice of the Party-state prevail and thus overshadow
critical voices. The overwhelming voice of the Party could guide ordinary In-
ternet users to discuss and comment on hot topics in a manner consistent
with the Party’s tone. For example, the People’s Daily, Xinhua News, and
CCTV News microblogs constituted the most important national microblog
team, attracting more than 30 million followers. (48) One notable case that
reflected the working mechanism of national microblog team was the haze
that blanketed China on 12 January 2013. The CCTV News microblog took
the lead in responding to the pollution, reminding netizens at 9:09 AM that
“haze has occurred in a number of cities nationwide, and please drive care-
fully.” (49) At 9:45 AM, People’s Daily followed up and repeated the content
of CCTV News reminding people to drive safely. The People’s Daily mi-
croblog also provided brief information on how to keep healthy in haze pol-
lution. (50) On 13 January 2013, Xinhua News posted a microblog mention-
ing how to maintain balanced nutrition in haze pollution. (51) Under the
leadership of the three Party media, haze pollution became a hot-button
issue on the microblogs. But the perspective used by the two microblogs
guided netizens to focus on self-protection rather than on questioning or
criticising the horrible environmental problems plaguing China. (52)
The government found the new strategy effective. According to data pro-
vided by People’s Daily Public Opinion Monitoring Room, regarding issues
drawing great attention and heated discussion since August 2013, the na-
tional microblog team was louder than any noise on the Internet. (53) Zhu
Huaxin, the general secretary of the Monitoring Room, wrote an editorial
on the China Youth Daily claiming that the national microblog team could
follow the central government’s stand on hot-button issues, which is in-
strumental to maintaining the authority and credibility of the central gov-
ernment and enhancing the communication of the “main melody.” (54)
Using the figurative expression that “the national microblog team success-
fully recaptured the microphone on the Internet,” Lu Wei held that the
scenario of the government being questioned, criticised, or even abused
has been successfully overturned. (55)
In addition to making the official voice louder on the Internet, govern-
ment microblogs are also paying renewed attention to guiding public
sentiment, an umbrella term that refers to the emotional and cognitive
reaction of ordinary people to information. As I have mentioned, the Chi-
nese (micro)blogosphere was characterised not only by the expression of
liberal and critical opinions, but also by emotional outpourings, such as
playfulness, sadness, resentment, grievance, and sympathy. For example,
in the case of Deng Yujiao, when the facts were still unclear, netizens cel-
ebrated Deng Yujiao as a heroine who fought against a privileged official,
whose death was considered well deserved. (56) Therefore, this particular
public opinion crisis was not only caused by the exposure of social prob-
lems on the Internet, but also by those problems churning up a tide of
negative emotion and dissatisfaction that resulted in Internet users
questioning leaders’ governing capacity, criticising official malfeasance,
or even mocking the Party’s rule. To salvage sagging government credi-
bility, the new leadership began to invest heavily in managing online
emotion. The overriding goal of emotion management is to reduce neg-
ative emotional outpourings and make people sympathetic to the Party’s
agenda. 
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Specifically, the new emphasis on regulating public emotion can be de-
tected through the transformation of official microblogs from a rigid pro-
pagandistic writing style to a much more energetic and literary form of ex-
pression. (57) In practice, some official microblogs began using lyrical phras-
ing or comments that were warm, positive, and devoid of stiff official over-
tones. The lyrical phrases or comments in general were not official re-
sponses to or explanations of news events, but rather words crafted to
comfort grieving people who were victims of these social problems.  
A telling example is the development of the People’s Daily microblog.
Featuring a delicate rhetoric and inspirational writing, the People’s Daily
microblog has expressed sympathy toward those injured or killed in emer-
gencies or to victims of social inequality. In addition to writing warm
words, the People’s Daily microblog also lights a candle and calls for
prayers for the victims of natural disasters and social problems. At the
same time, it calls on all Internet users to pray for a bright future. For ex-
ample, in the case of the terrorist attack in Kunming (58) on 1 March 2014,
People’s Daily published several warm comments such as “Let us pray for
the loss of life”; “Please light a candle and turn off the lights”; “Kunming,
do not weep”; “May the deceased rest in peace”; “Kunming will always be
beautiful, and we are with you, people of Kunming,” and so on. (59) It should
be noted that People’s Daily wrote nothing about how and why such ter-
rible events happened and how the government dealt with the emergency.
Nevertheless, the lack of key information related to the case did not cause
dissatisfaction among netizens. Instead, those warm microblogs guided
netizens to focus their attention on praying for the dead and injured rather
than on the case per se. Similarly, when news stories related to social in-
equality or abuse of power are disseminated on the Internet, the People’s
Daily microblog comforts angry netizens with claims that tomorrow will
be better. (60) For example, in the case of aforementioned nationwide haze
pollution on 11 January 2013, People’s Daily commented that “this [air
pollution] is not the life we want; while the present reality is grey China, a
beautiful China should be expected in the future.” (61) Moreover, the Peo-
ple’s Daily microblog came up with a column entitled “Hello, tomorrow”
aimed at facilitating netizens voicing their “Chinese dream” and propagat-
ing “positive energy.” Proposed by Xi Jinping on November 2012, the “Chi-
nese dream” became a new term within the system of Chinese socialist
thought. Xi has described the Chinese dream as “national rejuvenation, im-
provement of people’s livelihood, prosperity, construction of a better soci-
ety and military strengthening.” (62) Xi also encouraged ordinary people to
achieve individual dreams and thus contribute to the revitalisation of the
nation. The idea of the Chinese dream as a propaganda slogan is smart, be-
cause it can be extended to the national level as well as made specific at
the individual level. In this, the Party-state’s macroscopic Chinese dream
to build a strong party and nation articulates little conflict with ordinary
people’s microscopic dreams of a good life. (63) Therefore, although the Chi-
nese dream is still a symbolic resource to enhance the Communist Party’s
ideological and political authority, the Party has managed not to present it
in a top-down totalitarian and indoctrinating way. (64)
Xi’s image campaign and guiding public 
emotion 
Like his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has been keen to build an
image as a warm leader and show his closeness to ordinary people on the
Internet. To conduct his image campaign as an accessible leader, Xi has
actively embraced the microblog platform. What is more, his microblog
image campaign has been instrumental in leading public emotion on the
Internet and contributing to the new round of online public opinion reg-
ulation. 
There may be substantial differences between Xi and his predecessor
in communicating with ordinary people through microblogs. In simple
terms, Hu Jintao’s online presence consisted of scheduling occasional
online chat sessions with netizens on special occasions, such as People’s
Daily’s 60th anniversary and sessions of the National People’s Congress.
Such interaction, rare and arranged in advanced, was like a political of-
ficial’s visit to the virtual chatroom of ordinary people. In comparison,
Xi has attempted to appear online more frequently and in a more civil-
ian guise. The Xi regime has creatively arranged to post Xi’s casual visits
and activities on social media rather than in state-run traditional media.
Although information is still released through official microblog ac-
counts, the shift from Party media, which definitely represent authori-
tative discourse and official ideology, to the communication platform of
ordinary people benefits Xi’s campaign as accessible leader in at least
two aspects. First, it reduces the propagandistic tone. Second, Xi’s min-
gling with the public is meant to show his spontaneous willingness to
pay attention to ordinary people’s lives rather than to arrange official
inspections similar to the other formal activities a national leader en-
gages in.
For example, on 29 December 2013, Xi ate steamed buns in an ordinary
Beijing eatery called the Qing Feng Bun Shop. (65) Videos and photos of Xi’s
bun excursion were first broadcast by ordinary people on microblogs and
then reproduced on the state-run People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and
CCTV News microblog accounts. The videos and photos on the microblogs
quickly went viral on the Internet and received many positive comments
from ordinary people, who not only appreciated Xi as a warm and acces-
sible leader who queued up and ordered buns like ordinary people, but also
felt excited to serve as primary information sources on Xi’s visit. President
Xi continued his campaign to be regarded as a warm leader by taking a
stroll in Nan Luo Gu Xiang, a historic area of Beijing, on 25 February 2014.
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Xi’s casual visit was again reported on microblogs rather than by tradi-
tional state-run media. (66)
In parallel with Xi’s proactive use of social media to build his image, the
microblog account “Fan Club of Learning from Xi,” tasked with posting in-
formation about Xi’s official trips and stories and photographs of Xi and his
family members, was launched in November 2012. (67) The nickname Ping-
ping was used on the microblog instead of the formal and official name
Present Xi Jinping when referred to Xi’s family, previous educational and
work experience, mottos, and favourite sports. (68) Xi’s strategic employ-
ment of social media to cultivate his image was highly relevant to the
regime’s new emphasis on regulating online public emotion.  
Official and mainstream media have customarily been utilised by the
CCP authorities for their own propaganda purposes and therefore repre-
sent official discourse. By contrast, social media are regarded as a platform
empowering ordinary Chinese people with a voice. The immediacy of the
microblog postings about Xi’s visit, which appeared even earlier than in of-
ficial media, created the illusion that ordinary people were closer to Pres-
ident Xi and that ordinary people could get information faster than official
media. In a similar vein, unique information about Xi’s family life on the
microblog also bridges the gap between high-ranking officials and ordinary
people. Xi’s proactive accessing of the microblog is also aimed at alleviat-
ing pessimistic sentiments on the Internet and gauging public sentiment
on the Chinese cyberspace. People’s Daily Public Opinion Motoring Room
commented:
Xi’s image as a warm leader has been widely touted by ordinary In-
ternet users. Dissemination of Xi’s image and casual activity on so-
cial media has made a positive contribution to propagating the
Party’s ideology and putting pressure on jarring voices of criticism
and emotional outpourings against government. (69)
While the microblog account was called “Fan Club of Learning from Xi,”
some media analyst conjectured that the microblog was not the work of
real fans and was definitely not by ordinary grass-roots-level netizens. It
looks more like part of a well-designed propaganda effort by either the
central government or reporters from Party-run news media. (70) Although
still propaganda, it is carried out in a much cleverer and more humanised
way. (71)
Data from the People’s Daily Public Opinion Monitoring Room revealed
the effectiveness of this new tactic to regulate public opinion. Since Au-
gust 2013, negative comments on microblogs have declined by 63%. (72)
Positive public opinion on the Internet has successfully overwhelmed neg-
ative voices, as measured in two ways: a decrease in social problems ex-
posed by netizens on the Internet and in criticism against or emotional
outpourings towards the government. (73) A number of public intellectuals
have recently lamented the decline of critical discussion on social issues
on Chinese microblogs following officials’ tightening grip on them. (74)
Conclusion
This paper is about the government’s new strategies to manipulate on-
line public opinion since Xi Jinping came to power. Firstly, the new leader-
ship has stepped up efforts to tighten its reins on information and public
opinion on microblogging sites. In line with this, the new government pro-
posed Seven bottom lines and Six objectives as the general policy guide-
line. The proposal of “Seven bottom lines” represents a much more proac-
tive way to regulate online public opinion. Bottom lines, such as “mine-
field” or “high voltage,” were set for ordinary Internet users to stay clear of.
However, the description of bottom lines is extremely vague and could
provoke self-censorship among ordinary people. The strategy is the re-ap-
propriation of management over traditional media adapted to the new
media space, which tends to put new emphasis on self-discipline among
individual Internet users. In addition to regulating ordinary people, the Chi-
nese government for the first time aims at controlling the group of liberal
and outspoken public opinion leaders (Big Vs), whose opinions on the In-
ternet could attract intense attention and churn up a tide of public debate
on hot-button issues. Aware of the power of public opinion leaders in shap-
ing the public opinion trends, the government has on the one hand cracked
down on some dissenting public opinion leaders while wooing the more
docile ones to follow the Party line. The government has also intentionally
indoctrinated Medium Vs with the Party’s ideology and has them shoulder
the responsibility of proactively promoting pro-government opinions and
moulding online expression. 
In order to save the public opinion crisis and remedy the government’s
deteriorating public credibility, the central government has adopted new
tactics to uphold its influence on the Internet. In parallel with the core pol-
icy of promoting positive energy on the Internet and upholding the Chi-
nese dream, the new tactics are primarily designed to appease public sen-
timent on the Internet. Therefore, by virtue of the national microblog team
adding warm and sympathetic expression to government microblogs and
Xi’s image campaign as an accessible leader, government microblogs not
only continue to amplify the official voice on the Internet but also attempt
to channel public emotion. 
In essence, the CCP has not given up its ingrained habits of censorship
and control over online information, no matter how innovative and subtle
the strategies it uses. However, as this paper suggests, there is a new trend
of Internet strategy that has shifted from ex-post-facto deleting or censor-
ing of unfavourable information towards a proactive and pre-emptive ac-
tion that leads Internet users to post desirable information and actively
eradicate critical and negative information. Up to now, we lack scientific
data on whether these new strategies have been particularly effective in
regulating online information. However, the Party-state claims that the
new ideological campaign on the Internet has proven efficient. To some
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degree, the new regime has averted extensive public discussion and emo-
tional outpouring towards government deficiencies and social problems.
However, given that Chinese netizens have a long record of exposing
strategies to regulate the Internet and of breaking through ideological con-
trol, we should take a closer look at the future of Chinese cyberspace and
whether or not it will become a space purged of critical voices as the new
leadership envisages. 
Finally, yet critically, while the Party-state has devoted immense effort to
managing online public opinion, the decline of critical voices on mi-
croblogs might be attributable to other factors as well. One notable one is
the emergence and popularity of Tencent’s WeChat, a newer generation
social networking service aimed at optimising online activity through
smart phones. (75)
According to a report by the CNNIC, the number of microblog users
peaked in 2012 and then began to decline. In 2013, the number of mi-
croblog users dropped by 9% to 280 million, and in 2014 dropped another
7.1% to 249 million. (76) In comparison, WeChat users burgeoned by 41%
to 500 million in 2014. (77) At the same time, the overall number of Chinese
Internet users increased 9.5% to 618 million. Therefore, against the back-
ground of an accumulation of Chinese Internet users, the boom in WeChat
users has come at the expense of a drop in microblog users. The reduction
in critical voices and emotional outpouring on microblogs may therefore
also be the result of the migration of microblog users to WeChat. (78) How-
ever, increasingly draconian controls over microblog information and the
shifting of Internet users from microblogs to WeChat should not be under-
stood in isolation. As some scholars have pointed out, compared with mi-
croblogs as a public forum, WeChat tends to be a private form of commu-
nication designed for sharing information and photos among smaller
groups of people. Increasing control over microblogs therefore appears to
have forced some people to abandon public forums in favour of private cir-
cles to avoid political risk. (79)
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